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Victimization and Political Mobilization  
in Pre-Revolutionary Boston
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R
I n the summer of 1770 , at the height of the nonimportation con-troversy, an unremarkable Englishwoman made a remarkable allegation: the “Town or Leaders of the [merchants?]” had “resolved to banish all 
the Scotchmen” from Boston. The prelude, according to Ann Hulton, was 
the mobbing of a Scottish merchant, Patrick McMaster, for having defied 
the popular boycott of British imports and ignored a “warning [to] Quit the 
Town within 3 days, or . . . take the consequences.” The mob that seized him 
on the afternoon of Tuesday, June 19, had him “put into a Cart, exhibited . . . 
thro the Town, & were going to Tar & F[eather]: him, but . . . [instead] they 
forced an Oath from him, that he wod leave the place.” The crowd singled 
out McMaster for rough treatment, Ann Hulton reported, “in return” for 
the threat of some of Boston’s Scottish traders to relocate their businesses to 
another port after the town and its merchants had refused them permission to 
sell imported goods in order to raise capital for a shipbuilding project.1 
 Ann Hulton readily sympathized with the unfortunate McMaster, for later 
that night a noisy mob visited her at the Brookline home she shared with her 
brother Henry and his family a few miles from where the Scot was making 
his escape. Henry, a commissioner of the American Board of Customs, was 
awakened shortly after midnight by a caller named Sears who claimed to 
have an urgent letter for him from New York. Alert, suspicious, and armed, 
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Henry conducted an interview through a parlor window; when the would-be 
intruder tried to lever the sash window open, Henry slammed it shut on his 
hands. When this and other windows were quickly put in, Ann supposed that 
a mob had surrounded the house. She heard “violent blows” on the outside 
walls, and the “most hideous Shouting, dreadful imprecations, & threats en-
sued.” Henry later wrote that all indoors could plainly hear one assailant 
shouting, “dead or alive we will have him.” With the ladies, servants, and 
children hiding upstairs, the men of the house prepared to withstand a final 
assault that never came. How long the affray lasted is unclear, but the mob 
withdrew, leaving the occupants terrified and stunned. “We have reason to 
believe that it was not the sudden outrage of a frantic Mob, but a Plot artfully 
contrived to decoy My Bror into the hands of assasins.”2
 Whatever the truth of the matter, the Hultons and the families of other 
officials, together with Patrick McMaster, were so terrified that they sought 
refuge at Castle William in Boston Harbor. They remained on the island for 
three to four months, returning to the town only when they supposed that 
their personal safety was not in jeopardy. Thrown together by circumstances, 
unquestionably the genteel Englishwoman and the obscure Scot exchanged 
stories in the cramped apartments or castle grounds. McMaster and one of 
his brothers, observed Ann Hulton, looked like “ruind men & forlorn Wan-
derers.” The terror, if not her anger and anxiety, had ceased by the time she 
wrote of the events of June 19 five weeks later in a letter to a confidante, the 
wife of a Liverpool merchant.3
Ann Hulton’s atavistic depiction of crowd action provides a tantalizing coun-
terpoint to historiographical orthodoxy. This article does not aim to sub-
stantiate her accusations but to consider what they mean. It is a case study 
of the predicament of Britons living in pre-Revolutionary Boston and their 
relationships with each other and with angry colonists. The story of what 
happened to the Hultons and the McMasters allows some appreciation of 
what popular radicalism entailed for British sojourners during the imperial 
crisis. Ann Hulton believed that her family and the McMasters were victims 
of what today would be called ethnic violence or racial intimidation and revo-
lutionary plots. These allegations are startling even for a time when racism, 
sectarianism, servitude, and slavery were prevalent, and community violence 
was a common feature of political mobilization. Immigrant Britons—from 
England, Scotland, or Wales—were rarely victimized on the basis of their 
national origins. The victimization of a genteel Englishwoman and her family 
and a Scottish merchant may tell us something about latent ethnic tensions 
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in Boston and cultural encounters involving Britons and white colonists at a 
time of political unrest and uncertainty. It needs to be established whether or 
not the Hultons and McMasters were victims by design, but also, in a sense, 
if they were victims of their own circumstances—that is, if living dangerously 
on the periphery of empire brought them together. 
 The victimization of Hulton and McMaster to some extent was due to their 
“Britishness.” The Hultons’ status as imperial officials and the McMasters’ 
economic situation as merchant-shopkeepers importing British manufactures 
rendered them obnoxious to the Whig merchants. Moreover, because of their 
national origins and outsider status they were probably easy targets for radi-
cals trying to mobilize popular support for a nonimportation movement that 
was under severe strain. 
 More interesting, however, is that their attempts to rationalize what hap-
pened to them—to make sense of their victimization—reveal an awareness 
of a common British identity. Alienated as they were from the political main-
stream and subjected to intimidation, they reaffirmed a commitment to Brit-
ish imperialism and what it conveyed, or, for them, ought to convey: eco-
nomic opportunity, liberty , protection, and the rule of law—all of which they 
believed were being jeopardized by the colonial protests.
Plan of the Island Castle William. Manuscript plan by Henry 
DeBernire, ca. 1775. Collections of the MHS.
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 Finally, there is the intriguing prospect that these issues may also have in-
fluenced their attackers. What drove Ann Hulton to condemn the colonists in 
such harsh, uncompromising terms might have been the realization that some 
of the rioters were rejecting her version of Britishness. 
 Hitherto, historians have considered the McMaster mobbing and the af-
fray at Brookline as unrelated, minor protests: the former is notable only as 
an “abortive” attempt to tar and feather an importer, the latter as a demon-
stration of popular anger at the commissioners of Customs.4 Ann Hulton 
supposed, however, that these incidents were contiguous and linked. Her 
insinuation that Boston radicals mounted both attacks is not on its own of 
much historical significance. What is significant are the sinister motives that 
she ascribes to her family’s and McMaster’s assailants. Not only was the vio-
lence manifestly premeditated, but its wellspring was a source that few if 
any of her contemporaries have commented upon. If she was right, colonial 
radicalism may have encompassed—perhaps only momentarily—the insur-
rectionary tactics of inciting ethnic conflict and assassination.5
 Ann Hulton’s proposition that colonial radicalism in Boston was predis-
posed to victimize the British is at odds with historical interpretations. His-
torians generally emphasize the reformist nature of the protest movement’s 
aims and strategies under the leadership of colonial Whigs or Patriots, and 
the oppositional features of its extra-legal methods of protest. For sure, radi-
cal Whigs were often impatient with moderates, and the artisans and crafts-
men among them were far better than the merchants at mobilizing popular 
opinion and nurturing street-level contacts with townsfolk of the “lower 
sort.” Crowd action was occasionally anti-institutional, but it was not until 
the late summer of 1774 that in disabling Massachusetts’s royal government 
it became overtly revolutionary, and even then massive resistance proceeded 
in an orderly fashion without murderous intent or ethnic violence up to and 
beyond the commencement of military hostilities at Lexington and Concord.6 
With this in mind, Ann Hulton’s accusations might reasonably be considered 
rash, unwarranted, and inflammatory.
 First—regarding the question of assassination—the harassment of imperial 
officials is so well documented that it is highly unlikely that any Bostonians 
conspired to murder an officer of the Crown such as Commissioner Hulton. 
Historians generally mistrust the veracity of contemporary British criticism 
of the colonial protest movement’s seditious tendencies, for conspiracies and 
counter-conspiracies were easily imagined in pre-Revolutionary Boston: from 
radical claims that the British were hell-bent on abridging colonial liberties 
to royal governors’ hysterical references to assassination plots, treasonable 
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combinations, and incipient militancy.7 With 16,000 citizens living cheek by 
jowl with 4,000 British soldiers since October 1768, it was inevitable that 
frictions would give rise to wild accusations, especially when Ann Hulton 
composed her letter, in the aftermath of the infamous Boston Massacre when 
the British military presence was scaled down.
 Second—the matter of ethnic violence—if there were a plan to expel the 
Scots it was never implemented. Ann Hulton’s terminology is disingenuous 
insofar as it implies that the Boston town meeting and/or the merchant lead-
ers were acting corporately to expel McMaster and other Scots when in fact 
no such decision was ever formally taken. Neither the Scots nor any other na-
tional group were persecuted by colonial civic authorities or voluntary asso-
ciations on account of their ethnicity, and none of their ilk was ever murdered 
by a lynch mob. National minorities never encountered state-sponsored pro-
scription as foreigners did in Revolutionary France or, despite popular anti-
Catholicism, the kind of intense religious hatred that London mobs spouted 
during the Gordon Riots of 1780.8
 The prime consideration here is to establish an historical context for Hul-
ton’s accusations. It is not essential to develop a solid legal foundation for 
the investigation that follows, for the criminality of the proceedings cannot 
be precisely ascertained. The full “legal facts” are insubstantial since neither 
incident led to a prosecution; in any case, at a distance of more than two hun-
dred years it is impossible to prove the allegations incontrovertibly. However, 
engagement with the “historical facts,” such as they are,9 allows some ap-
preciation of the nature of the crimes committed on June 19, 1770, and their 
wider relevance.
 The predicament of British sojourners, as the likes of the Hultons and the 
McMasters epitomized, can be understood within the broader context of his-
torical research into identity formation in the Atlantic world.10 British impe-
rial expansion in the eighteenth century indubitably fostered a shared sense 
of Britishness—of belonging to a “Greater Britain”—among the peoples of 
Great Britain and the American colonies. The benefits were legion: military 
protection, commerce, Protestantism, and the inestimable advantage of lib-
erty. Bostonians’ perceptions of their own local, regional, and national iden-
tities comprised themes of consciousness that were concurrent and comple-
mentary, rather than contradictory: of being inhabitants of a thriving seaport, 
of being New Englanders proud of their Puritan heritage, and of being, cul-
turally speaking, innately both “American” and “British.” While historians 
disagree over the labels and what they mean in cultural terms—whether to 
describe the colonists as British-Americans or British provincials—it is clear 
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that the imperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770 failed to meet the colonists’ 
political aspirations.11 Being British, the colonists protested, ought to confer 
the full “[constitutional] rights of Englishmen,” as commensurate with their 
status as citizens of the empire and irrespective of their provincialism; these 
rights, as they protested, were patently being denied them. From a colonial 
perspective, Britishness may have conveyed tangible benefits, but in consti-
tutional terms it ultimately proved to be an imagined state—something that 
was argued over, protested, yet never attained. When it could not be secured 
politically, it was rejected and eventually replaced by American republican 
norms and labels. 
 Historiography is not so advanced as to assume that for the constituent na-
tions of mainland Britain—the English, the Scots, and the Welsh—the Ameri-
can Revolution was a similarly epochal event or transformative process in 
shaping their identities. Being British was less imaginary than it was for co-
lonial Americans, at least if we assume that these labels meant something to 
people. The growth of empire and war with France and America certainly 
allowed Britons to define their collective national identity against foreign 
others. Even so, for the English elites and nonelites, Britishness was often 
English nationalism writ large. Culturally speaking, the Celtic fringe was not 
any less provincial than the colonies when viewed from London, but unlike 
the Americans, the Scots and the Welsh did not have to engage in a political 
struggle to secure their constitutional rights. The Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 
did not appreciably prevent the Scots from enjoying the fruits of union with 
England, albeit doubts over Scottish loyalty were omnipresent in political 
literature during the Wilkes and Liberty controversy of the 1760s.
 Britishness, then, meant similar things to different groups of people. These 
issues do not figure prominently in political histories of Revolutionary Mas-
sachusetts.12 However, they are an essential corollary when considering how 
white native-born colonists and constituent Britons regarded their own and 
each other’s predicaments as imperial citizens. The problem before us is not 
about revisiting identity formation as such, but understanding how two Brit-
ons responded to their relocation to Boston. Perhaps that can explain why 
what happened to Patrick McMaster so appalled Ann Hulton. Hulton’s al-
legations of ethnic conflict and sedition may have been rash, but it remains to 
be seen if they were wholly unwarranted and inflammatory.
While it is tempting to dismiss Ann Hulton (d.1779) as an unreliable histori-
cal witness, her letters can be read as testimony to cultural tensions between 
New Englanders and the British imperial elite of senior Crown officials and 
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their families. Like many sojourning Britons caught up in the imperial crisis, 
she peppered her private correspondence with cavalier condemnations of the 
American colonists. She had come to Massachusetts in early 1768, accom-
panying the wife and baby son of her thirty-seven-year-old brother Henry 
(1730/1–1790). She was particularly close to Henry, as much through circum-
stances as affection: unmarried and dependent upon her older brother (with 
whom she lived after his return from the Antigua Customhouse in 1760), she 
was nonetheless excited by the opportunity of leaving London that Henry’s 
promotion from the Plantation Office afforded. Henry was less enamored 
of the prospect of returning to the colonies to take up a post that he “never 
solicited” but for which it seems he was considered admirably suited.13 Henry 
Hulton arrived in November 1767 as the senior commissioner to the new 
American Board of Customs based in Boston, whose principal function was 
to enforce the trade and revenue laws; it proved to be the most unpopular 
imperial agency ever foisted upon the colonists.
 Ann soon found reason to resent her new situation. She once professed to 
be ill-suited “by nature or inclination” to polite society in Bath or London,14 
which, for someone from her upper-middling background, may be indicative 
of social insecurities. On joining the imperial elite she affected disdain for 
colonial provincialism, complaining to her confidante of the want of good 
servants and good schools as well as the expense of having to import stylish 
Wedgwood ware and “elegant cutlery” from England. “Here we follow the 
fashions in England & have made great strides in Luxury & Expence within 
these three years,” she sniffed, attributing this progress largely to the assem-
blies that the commissioners organized to curry favor with the Boston gentry. 
As for the country folk, she supposed that their civility to “us Strangers” was 
a ruse “to make us pay more handsomely for every thing.”15
 The Hultons’ assumption of cultural superiority and awareness of the so-
cial distinctiveness that their official position conferred were compounded by 
the imperial crisis that fostered popular resentment of British officials respon-
sible for enforcing the hated Townshend Acts. She worried what the colonists’ 
“Republican . . . & levelling principles” might bring upon her family.16 Twice, 
when mobs took to Boston’s streets, the Hultons and other officials and their 
families (more than sixty persons in total—the core of the imperial establish-
ment) thought it prudent to leave their homes for the safety of Castle William, 
the Crown’s fortress in Boston Harbor. The first retreat, occasioned by the 
Liberty Riot of June 10, 1768, lasted five months (including nine days spent 
on board HMS Romney.) Soon afterward the Hultons purchased a house 
belonging to the colony’s most eminent lawyer and former Masonic Grand 
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Master, the recently deceased Jeremiah Gridley; set in thirty acres of orchards 
in the village of Brookline, it was on the road to Cambridge five miles clear 
of Boston and its hostile crowds—or so the Hultons presumed. The second 
retreat, two years later, was altogether more frightening for Ann, for it shat-
tered the illusions of peace and privacy that she cherished when she went to 
bed on the night of June 19.
 Status anxiety, frustration, disappointment, fear of the mob, the catharsis 
of recalling traumatic events—all of these shaped Ann Hulton’s worldview 
in the summer of 1770. Her siege mentality did abate by the autumn of that 
year when the troubles subsided, but until then she was primed to reach out 
to other Britons in distress.
 Recent research has added much to the little that has been known about 
the victim of the Boston riot. Patrick McMaster was born on March 19, 
1741, at Currochtrie farm in Kirkmaiden parish in the Rhinns of Galloway, 
a few miles north of Scotland’s most southerly point; that same day, he was 
baptized in the local Presbyterian church, likely because he was sickly. He was 
the fourth of eleven children born to John McMaster and Jannet McGeoch. 
For the most part (from 1737 to 1746 and 1749 to 1754, and beyond) the 
family lived at Challoch, near Dunragit, in the parish of Old Luce, seven miles 
east of the port town of Stranraer.17 Challoch Farm belonged to the Hays of 
Park, local gentry, and Patrick McMaster’s father, John McMaster, was likely 
a tenant farmer or “gudeman”—occupying a rung above that of the humble 
cottar but below the Hays’ tacksman from whom he would have leased the 
farm.18 A paternal uncle, also Patrick McMaster (a father of ten children), 
was a modest property holder in the nearby village of Glenluce, and another 
relative, Thomas McMaster, was a merchant in Stranraer.19 It is tricky to ex-
plain the subtle social gradations of early-modern rural Scotland in modern 
terms, but in view of his father’s tenancy, his own literacy, his family’s con-
nections, and his relatives’ property portfolio, our victim Patrick McMaster 
could be said to have been of a lower-middling status.
 What persuaded the McMaster brothers to leave Galloway were limited 
life opportunities (as was the case with Galloway’s most famous son—John 
Paul Jones [b.1747].) The local, agricultural-based economy was slowly im-
proving, largely as a result of new farming techniques encouraged by land-
owners and longer leases given to progressive tenants; farmers who grew 
oats, barley, and wheat were diversifying into rearing black cattle for beef 
markets in central Scotland and northwest England. The economic condition 
of the peasantry, however, remained dire in the short term. In the seventeenth 
century, the peasantry sustained the Covenanter rebellions; in the eighteenth 
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century, their anger at the mass evictions that accompanied early attempts to 
enclose land for beef cattle was vented in the Levelers’ Rising of 1724–1725, 
and latterly found a safety valve of sorts in emigration. Many years later, a 
local minister reported on how little impact the improvers had made in Old 
Luce and that the local population was declining. By the time of the Revo-
lutionary War, when Scottish emigration to the American colonies was at its 
peak, nearly thirty men, women, and children had left the parish for the New 
World.20 
 With no property likely to come their way from either their father or uncle, 
Patrick McMaster and three of his four surviving brothers joined the exo-
dus. Sailing from the port of Leith, near Edinburgh, John McMaster entered 
Boston on September 22, 1765. He soon established the business that James, 
the oldest brother, took over a year later; twenty-six-year-old Patrick arrived 
from Glasgow on August 17, 1767, with a “large” cargo of goods; and they 
were aided by the youngest brother, Daniel, then just thirteen years old.21 
James McMasters & Co. imported linen, silk, textiles, and tobacco from 
Glasgow and London, which they sold in their Boston shop and distributed 
to other shopkeepers in the province.
 It is a mystery how or from whom the McMaster brothers managed to 
acquire capital to set up shop in America. They may have been financed by 
their uncle Patrick or by his social superiors among the Galloway elites, many 
of whom had substantial interests in the slave trade and colonial commerce. 
It is also likely that they were factors for firms operating out of Glasgow, a 
town becoming prosperous from trade with the Chesapeake region. Scottish 
trade with North America had been growing since the Act of Union between 
Scotland and England (1707), which allowed Scots full access to the English 
colonies—and to lucrative tobacco markets in Virginia and Maryland. The 
McMaster brothers were aiming to profit from developing trade links be-
tween Scotland and New England, which were relatively minor in the larger 
scheme of transatlantic commerce and did not take off until the mid 1760s, 
just as they were relocating to Boston.22
 The McMasters were to weather the vicissitudes of nonimportation rather 
better than some of their colonial counterparts. Later, they claimed to have 
imported around £15,000 worth of British manufactures annually between 
1769 and 1774, a figure that, if taken at face value, would mean that McMas-
ters & Co. dominated the Massachusetts market in Scottish imports.23 They 
also set up a distribution network from and acquired property in Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire. A whiff of snobbery can be detected in Ann Hulton’s con-
descending depiction of Patrick McMaster as “an honest industrious Trades-
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man,” though it was a common descriptor, and a start of surprise on learning 
he and his brothers had amassed “3 or 4000 £ sterlg in Effects, & . . . more in 
outstandg debts.”24
The McMasters’ commercial aspirations go a long way to explaining their 
reluctance to submit to the nonimportation agreements drawn up by Bos-
ton’s merchants between March 1768 and October 1769 and endorsed by 
the town meeting. Their firm received at least seven consignments of British 
imports while the boycott was in force.25 The firm consistently refused to bow 
to pressure from the merchants, and it endured twelve months of petty abuse: 
the frontage of their home and adjoining shop was smeared with “filth,” 
their characters “reviled” in the local newspapers and at town meetings, and 
their doors and windows regularly broken.26 Eventually, local people were 
exhorted to boycott their shop, a method both legal and highly effective.27 
 The ostracism of the McMasters is not enough to explain why Patrick 
was subsequently attacked, although they did not stand alone. They were 
among a group of up to fourteen merchant-shopkeepers, including recent 
immigrants and “young, newly established merchants,” who, according to 
historian John Tyler, viewed nonimportation as a scheme by prominent Whig 
wholesale merchants to drive importing retailers from the congested market 
in British goods. Scottish traders James and Robert Selkrig and the printer 
and Edinburgh-born publisher John Mein were also prominent refuseniks. In 
response to his own proscription, John Mein sensationally published in his 
Boston Chronicle over several months the cargo manifests of consignments 
arriving for 285 Boston firms—to the considerable embarrassment of those 
Whigs who were named; he was acting on official information supplied by 
another Scot, Thomas Irving, the inspector general of Customs.28
 Of concern to the merchants was the possibility that the importers’ defi-
ance might encourage defections within a movement already straining with 
internal tensions. Consequently, from the autumn of 1769 through the fol-
lowing summer, persuasion gave way to coercion. The story of John Mein’s 
“drubbing” by Whig merchants on October 28 requires a brief retelling here. 
The mobbing was spontaneous, arising out of a contretemps in King Street 
between the printer, together with his Scottish business partner, John Fleem-
ing, and some merchants whom he had caricatured in the Boston Chronicle. 
Bruised but not badly hurt, Mein was so disturbed by shouts of “Kill Him” 
coming from the gathering crowd that he panicked and brandished a pistol 
before reaching the safety of the guard house. The pistol went off acciden-
tally without injuring anyone, but had someone been killed in the mêlée it is 
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conceivable that Mein and Fleeming would have been lynched. As it was, a 
local justice pursued Mein for illegally discharging a firearm and his creditors 
hounded him out of Boston and sent him fleeing to England.29 In the wake 
of this and other minor fracases, the “Body of Trade” mobilized hundreds of 
ordinary Bostonians—merchants, artisans, tradesmen, women—to visit the 
homes and shops of the principal importers. These visits passed off peacefully 
enough during January.30 The fatal shooting of five townspeople by British 
soldiers on the night of March 5 was not directly connected to the nonimpor-
tation controversy, but the withdrawal of the British regiments from the town 
afterward left importers and Britons feeling extremely vulnerable. To Scots 
loyalists such as James Murray, a retired North Carolina sugar merchant and 
one of the few proponents of the hated Stamp Act,31 the town teetered on the 
verge of civil disorder: Murray had vainly tried to read the Riot Act to the 
townspeople that sorry night, and subsequently he worked hard to collect 
evidence for the soldiers’ defense. 32
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Pages 12 and 13 from A State of the Importations from Great-Britain into the Port 
of Boston, Mein and Fleeming. Boston, 1769. Collections of the MHS.
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 The mobbing of McMaster was not indicative of civil disorder but can be 
viewed as a logical progression from verbal abuse to physical intimidation, 
in keeping with the escalation of controlled violence and the mobilization of 
popular support that characterized the nonimportation movement.33 In pun-
ishing malefactors like McMaster, the radical Whigs aimed to curtail dissent 
more generally. However, leaving aside the mobbing of John Mein, no other 
importer was targeted with such a level of violence. And Patrick McMas-
ter was the only importer to be threatened with the humiliation of tar and 
feathers.
 Why, then, single out a Scotsman—if indeed that was what was intended? 
Comments by Sir Francis Bernard and Henry Hulton deserve inspection. 
When two shiploads of “Scotch and North Country goods” came in, Ber-
nard observed, “It is remarkable that the Scotch Merchants, who are a con-
siderable Body, are all, to a Man, Importers.”34 A year later, Henry Hulton 
pronounced, “To the honor of Scotland her sons have kept free from the 
general contagion, they have not joined either at home or abroad, in the de-
fection from Authority, but proved themselves good subjects, and supporters 
of Government, and order.”35 Both observations imply that the Scottish trad-
ers were solidly against nonimportation, from which it can be deduced that 
the number of Scots opposing the scheme was greater than the few who were 
publicly condemned—John Mein, the McMasters, James Murray, and James 
and Robert Selkrig, who had also recently arrived in Boston.36 
 The Scots were one of four principal immigrant groups in the American 
colonies, but they “largely ignored” New England before the War of Indepen-
dence closed off mass emigration to the colonies,37 preferring to go to Virginia, 
the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, or New York as indentured servants or head to 
the backcountry as pioneer farmers. Scottish migrants to the colonies—and 
to Boston—maintained communities of interest based on commerce and 
preserved more than a semblance of a distinct national identity, irrespective 
of acculturation processes.38 Political and economic tensions between Scot-
tish immigrants and their American-born neighbors were noticeable if not 
pronounced. Conflicts occurred in frontier communities where Scots were a 
dominant social group; in the North Carolina backcountry of 1774, Gaelic-
speaking Highlanders aroused colonial suspicions; and in tidewater Virginia, 
local merchants resented the operations of Scottish factors. The patent un-
popularity of the Scots in the Revolutionary era, however, derived not from 
conflicts of interest or ethnicity per se but largely from the loyalism of many 
Scots who arrived on the eve of the Revolution. Even so, the Scots were as 
divided in their allegiances as any other national group.39
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 Boston’s Scots were a small, recognizable minority. There were no large 
concentrations of Scots in New England or sustained immigration from Scot-
land during the eighteenth century.40 Massachusetts’s Scottish-born popula-
tion was somewhere between 4 and 10 percent of the total,41 and by the mid 
1760s, there were about 3,330 adult male Scots in the province.42 Prisoners 
taken by the Cromwellian regime during the Covenanting rebellions of the 
mid seventeenth century were among the first emigrants from Scotland, while 
Scottish merchants began operating out of Boston in the 1650s. By the late 
seventeenth century, Boston’s Scots had built up substantial overseas connec-
tions with Britain, the West Indies, and other colonies. The Scots Charitable 
Society, of which the McMasters and the Selkrigs were members, sustained an 
informal, independent social and economic network.43 However, there were 
no appreciable conflicts of interest between established Scots incomers and 
native-born Bostonians before the Revolution.44
 It was not until the imperial crisis that the activities of Boston’s Scottish 
merchants exhibited partisanship. Twenty out of the twenty-seven remaining 
members of the Scots Charitable Society became loyalists in 1775.45 Also 
notable is the fact that, in addition to the McMasters, around thirty other 
Scots merchants eventually became loyalists, and of these about half arrived 
in Boston during the 1760s.46 With fewer local attachments than their colo-
nial neighbors, these newly arrived Scots merchants were more inclined to 
embrace loyalism. Otherwise, it should not be presumed that the Scots as a 
whole were predisposed toward loyalism: for every Scottish loyalist in Bos-
ton there were probably ten times as many taxpayers in the town of Scottish 
origin whose allegiances are as yet unknown.
 Patrick McMaster’s predicament, if not his ordeal, helps to illuminate 
the socio-economic aspects of loyalism. A young, arriviste trader, his profile 
matches that of the other importers described by John Tyler who resisted 
nonimportation. Immigrant enterprise explains why Patrick McMaster was 
so determined to defend what he had ventured and what he had gained to the 
point where, in view of what his defiance brought upon him, his resilience be-
came foolhardy. Two other aspects of that development deserve closer exami-
nation, however. The first is cultural inasmuch as it concerns the prevalence of 
anti-Scottish propaganda. The second is political, insofar as the McMasters 
themselves, like Mein, tried to sow seeds of disunion among the townsfolk 
and Whig merchants in order to advance the shipbuilding scheme. Both of 
these can explain why a Scotsman, and Patrick McMaster in particular, was 
subsequently targeted.
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Mein’s subterfuge may well have fanned resentment of Boston’s Scottish mer-
chants. Boston was not awash with anti-Scottish propaganda in the way that 
London was during the short-lived unpopular administration of the Scottish 
aristocrat John Stuart, the earl of Bute (1762–1763). Londoners, unsettled by 
the Scots’ descent on the metropolis, reveled in polemicist John Wilkes’s sati-
rization of the Scot as a duplicitous krypto-Jacobite, always ready to sacrifice 
the principles of the Glorious Revolution and surrender Liberty, Protestant-
ism, and Empire to the Tyranny of Rome and a Catholic Pretender. Colo-
nists who kept a close eye on the antics and tribulations of this controversial 
English reformer could be forgiven for imitating his Anglo-centrism.47 The 
lawyer John Adams, who was prone to xenophobic outbursts, remarked that 
despite the achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment the Scots “have not 
the most worthy ideas of liberty.”48 Whig propagandists were able to contrast 
the avarice of the “Jacobite” importers with the selflessness of Boston mer-
chant John Hancock in financing the return of imported goods to Britain.49 
Nonetheless, colonial Whigs seeking relevant analogies to their own struggles 
frequently cited Scottish history, from the civil wars and sectarian strife of 
the mid seventeenth century to the failed Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, and not 
always negatively.50 
 An affected provincial-centrism—localism rather than wanton prejudice—
characterized most attempts to tarnish the Scots’ reputations. These themes 
resonate in one rare pamphlet by a “Gentleman descended from a good Fam-
ily, of the first Settlers of New-England” that mercilessly lampoons James 
Murray:
That, Sir, is a Bretton, that made the best of his way out of Scotland very 
soon after a certain affair that took place in 1745. He lived obscure, and 
intimate with poverty for several years in one of our southern colonies, 
and is now here a hanger on,\ upon a worthy sister that advantageously 
married to a superannuated gentleman of fortune: He is now of the 
quorum, and one of Verres’s [Thomas Hutchinson] private council, and 
nocturnal informers, ready, and waiting to receive any little favour that 
the Com—rs [American Board of Customs Commissioners] or his Ex—cy 
procure him; for which he is (Culloden out of the question) a very staunch 
prerogative man, Sir, braying out passive obedience in the true broad Scot-
tish accent.51 
This short profile contains all the principal elements that in Patriot propa-
ganda distinguish good American Whigs from Scots “Tories.” First, language: 
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to colonial ears Murray spoke English like (and even after thirty years in the 
colonies, as incomprehensibly as) a Breton rather than a North Briton (the 
moniker assumed by metropolitanized, learned Scots anxious to divest them-
selves of their “Scotticisms” in speech and manners). Second, poverty: want 
had bred unbridled ambition and fed the deviousness that had brought Mur-
ray into the sanctum of colonial government. Third, proto-loyalism: Murray 
allegedly hankered after Jacobitism and subscribed to the discredited Tory 
doctrines of passive obedience and nonresistance long associated with Stuart 
despotism.
 Deriding McMaster instead of Murray would have been equally simple, 
had the radicals chosen to do so. His business partnership with his brothers 
would have been exposed as an example of the clannishness for which the 
Scots were popularly condemned on both sides of the Atlantic. McMaster’s 
Galloway dialect would also have elicited comments like those directed at 
Murray, for it would have been unfamiliar to New England ears. McMas-
ter’s commercial activities during the boycott were the most potent affront to 
community sensibilities, as his proscription in the town records of October 
4 attests. The McMasters, Mein, and other importers had patently discoun-
tenanced an agreement “approved by all Orders as legal [and] peaceable,” 
preferring “their little private advantage to the common Interest of all the 
colonies.” The town “unanimously” voted to appoint a committee of inspec-
tion to undertake a “strict enquiry” into their activities, and by the end of the 
month had voted to continue nonimportation until the Townshend duties 
were lifted.52
 The most prominent of the Scots merchants, then—James Murray, John 
Mein, the Selkrigs, and the McMasters—were, as they would have said, weel-
kent faces by 1770. All of them had crossed the line dividing supporters (the 
reluctant and the committed) from opponents of the protest movement: Mein, 
by provoking the Whig merchants; Murray, by helping the defense counsel 
at the Boston Massacre trial; and the Selkrigs and the McMasters, for their 
wanton defiance of the common weal. One of them had been attacked and 
another publicly ridiculed, but in the course of a few months the others would 
also encounter their own furies.
 What set the Scottish merchants on a collision course with the Whig mer-
chants was the latter’s insistence that the boycott applied to all traders and 
consumers irrespective of whether they were residents, either permanent or 
temporary, or recent arrivals. By the autumn of 1769, as we have seen, non-
cooperation was regarded as a tacit refusal to abide by a community decision. 
While a few native Bostonians continued to advertise imported goods for 
72
t h e  m as sac h u s e t t s  h i s to r i c a l  r e v i e w
sale, the defiance of the Scots drew attention to the apparent willingness of 
“strangers” to flout the moral authority of the boycott. On October 2, two 
days before the proscription of McMasters & Co. and John Mein in the town 
records, the Boston Evening Post published an “advertisement” that pur-
ported “to convince our Brethren in the other Governments” that the nonim-
portation agreement was being “strictly . . . adhered to” despite Mein’s “false 
and malicious insinuations.” Perhaps not wishing to offend Boston’s more 
established Scottish residents, the printers rejected the imputation that the 
condemnation of the Scots importers was owing to “any prejudices against 
the Scotch as a People, to many of whom we are sensible that the cause of 
Liberty is much indebted.” 
 The substance of the advertisement comprised a letter dated August 23 and 
composed by five Scottish shipbuilders requesting leave from the merchants 
and town to sell their goods. The five subscribers (Richard Hunter, Alexan-
der Auld, Patrick Bogle, Robert Park, and Hugh Brown) had been “sent and 
employed” by Glasgow merchants53 to supervise a shipbuilding project; the 
wages of the carpenters, shipwrights, caulkers, and laborers were to be paid 
from monies raised from the sale of “Scotch manufactures” they had brought 
with them. Six ships, totaling between eleven and twelve hundred tons, were 
already under construction in yards at Boston and Charlestown. Most vessels 
constructed in Boston were for the North American coastal trade, but the 
average tonnage of the ships being built by the Scots is typical of the larger 
vessels that plied the Atlantic.54 The project, however, was doomed, the ship-
builders’ protested, unless they were given dispensation to sell their wares.
 This is the shipbuilding scheme that Ann Hulton believed was at the root 
of the attack on Patrick McMaster and the alleged plan “to banish all the 
Scotchman.” The involvement of the McMasters and the Selkrigs can be in-
ferred from the shipbuilders’ allusion to anonymous “Gentlemen” who were 
ready to conduct business on their behalf “at any time.” These gentlemen 
were expected not only to broker the sale of the shipbuilders’ “Scotch manu-
factures” but to intercede with the merchants and the town selectmen on their 
behalf, because as nonresidents Hunter and his colleagues did not have the 
right to petition the town meeting. (The gentlemen may also have invested 
in the scheme.) The Whigs would have welcomed neither prospect. The de-
cision to raise their concerns in another public forum—the Boston Evening 
Post—was prompted not only by the likelihood of being rebuffed but by a 
desire to break the Whig stranglehold. 
 A close reading of the open letter reveals that the shipbuilders’ plea for 
exemption was not a benign proposal but a direct challenge to the Whig mer-
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chants. Their letter urges “Gentlemen, Tradesmen, and others concerned” 
to ask the town meeting to review the boycott’s applicability to nonresidents 
and to clarify that matter publicly. In addressing an audience beyond the 
merchants’ committees and town officials, the shipbuilders not only mirrored 
the activities of the Whigs themselves in mobilizing popular support to en-
force the boycott through the “Body of the Trade” but sought to undermine 
their influence. Their target group was Boston’s workers—the artisans and 
laborers who constituted the foot soldiers of the Body. The letter begins with 
a statement clarifying the shipbuilders’ status in an economic hierarchy: as 
clients of wealthy men in Glasgow, they absolved themselves from any blame 
in having to exhort Boston’s workers to face up to a bitter truth—the con-
sequences of losing the employment that the Scots promised. With the Scots 
prevented from raising capital, how were the tradesmen they had already 
engaged going to be paid?
Every person employed in ship business must know, that considering the 
circumstances of the tradesmen, it would be almost impossible for them 
to maintain their families if they were to be wholly paid in Goods, and 
their difficulties will be still greater, if the building the Scotch ships here 
be wholly withdrawn, by means of prohibiting the sale of Scotch manu-
factures sent for the payment of their ships.
The community, the letter continued, “must be sensible of what an effect 
the want of such a beneficial trade must have upon the laboring Poor of the 
town.”55 
 It was not uncommon for imperial officials to raise the specter of social 
conflict to frighten Whig leaders, but in this instance the Scots exposed a 
thorny question about skilled and unskilled workers’ commitment to the 
protest movement. Thomas Hutchinson once remarked that Boston’s work-
ers were “so infatuated” with nonimportation as to appear oblivious to the 
impact that the boycott was having on their own families and the local econ-
omy.56 Boston’s unskilled laborers were not oblivious, of course: the penury 
of the unemployed and under-employed undeniably worsened during nonim-
portation, which may be why the direct involvement of these people in the 
movement was sporadic and closely monitored by Whigs. Skilled workers, 
such as shipwrights and craftsmen, whose participation is clearer, continued 
to demand high wages from shipbuilders, much to the irritation of Governor 
Bernard and the Scots; nonimportation, it seems, despite impending hard-
ship, had lowered neither expectations among skilled workers nor demand for 
their labor.57 Thus, in theory at least, Scots shipbuilders could have tempted 
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skilled and unskilled workers to abjure their commitment to the boycott had 
they been able to persuade the town to give themselves preferential treatment. 
It was a lot for any outsider to ask, let alone expect, in hard times.
 The shipbuilders demanded an answer in fourteen days, but they were left 
to sweat for six weeks. It is possible that the merchants persuaded the printers 
of the Boston Evening Post, Thomas and John Fleet, by no means committed 
Whigs, not to publish the shipbuilders’ controversial letter. That can explain 
why, when the letter was published on October 2, the accompanying edito-
rial said nothing about its real importance. The Fleets’ denial that Bostonians 
were prejudiced towards the Scots was also probably intended to defuse the 
Whigs’ anger, for the Whigs were already having to react to events that they 
labored to control. The arrival of fresh consignments of goods, including one 
brought in by a nonresident Englishman, Patrick Smith, on October 3 raised 
again the question of what to do with nonresidents. This time around, the 
town meeting and the merchants insisted that nonresident traders as well 
as residents deposit the banned imports in common stores. Only four firms 
refused, including McMasters & Co. and John Mein, and the following day 
they were proscribed in the town records.
 It might be said that the shipbuilders and their backers never had a chance 
so long as the radicals held the upper hand in the town, if not always among 
the merchants. However, despite the commitment of Boston’s workers to the 
boycott, there was a substantial minority who regretted losing an opportu-
nity of making money. To the radicals’ and merchants’ consternation, the 
shipbuilders ran up a petition for exemption that more than seventy artisans 
signed.58 When it was peremptorily dismissed, one Tory supposed that up-
wards of £30,000 in future trade with Scotland was at stake for Boston; this 
was an exaggeration, but Bernard was probably closer to the mark in sup-
posing that the neighboring ports of Salem, Newburyport, and Marblehead 
would one day reap the benefits of Boston’s patriotism.59 
 Because of this the Scots did not abandon their scheme. At least two Scot-
tish shipbuilders moved to Newburyport to construct 230 tons of shipping.60 
They may have been the Selkrig brothers, who, having first bowed to pres-
sure to desist trading, managed to recruit enough local tradesmen to prompt 
a response by the “Body of Trade”: on May 5, 1770, the Body refused the 
Selkrigs permission to finance the building of two ships, preferring that they 
should be “out of business.”61 Indeed, it might have been James Selkrig in-
stead of Patrick McMaster who was mobbed on June 19. At noon that day, 
a mob assailed Selkrig at the town dock, shouting “no Scotchman could Tell 
the Truth.” His ready compliance to cease trading altogether, together with 
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the fact that his daughter was dying, most surely saved him from rougher 
treatment.62 There is no evidence to connect the radical Boston representative 
Samuel Adams with James Selkrig’s assailants, but the Scot would have later 
enjoyed Adams’s discomfort during the Boston Massacre trials: the deposi-
tions of Selkrig and fellow Scot William Hunter were the principal sources for 
the strange case of the “tall gentleman in a red Cloak” and white wig, whose 
identity was never established, but whom they saw directing the crowd on the 
night of the Massacre.63
 There is also the case of Robert Jamieson, a Marblehead schoolteacher, 
who refused to subscribe to the town’s nonconsumption and nonimportation 
agreements. He petitioned acting governor Thomas Hutchinson for protec-
tion, fearing “aproaching danger.” Jamieson was ruined when parents re-
moved their children from his school and he was pursued by his Whig credi-
tors; his last known residence was Salem gaol, which he “indeavoured to bear 
with that Magnanimity of Mind which becomes a North Brittan.”64
 The McMaster brothers were as obdurate as Jamieson but noticeably lack-
ing the Selkrigs’ acumen. James McMaster was “highly insolent” to a com-
mittee of inspection, a Whig source reported, telling them to “do as they 
pleased,” having “found they intended to make a Riot, which he should be very 
glad to see.”65 On November 15, the McMasters received their largest con-
signment yet—twenty-five containers of silk, ribbons, millenary, cambrics, 
and other items.66 McMasters & Co. was again proscribed in the town re-
cords on March 16, yet a month later the Whigs learned that James McMas-
ter had been selling imported goods up in Portsmouth.67 
 The most provocative of all their activities hitherto, however, was their 
participation in a nascent countermovement. Dissent and discontent with the 
continuation of the boycott among the merchants and shopkeepers of Boston 
and other colonial ports had grown quickly since news arrived of the North 
administration’s partial repeal of the Townshend Acts. The McMasters par-
ticipated in meetings of dissident merchants held on May 1 and 23 at which 
they called for an end to general nonimportation.68 Boston’s nonimportation 
agreement, however, remained operational until October, and the boycott on 
tea was to continue indefinitely until the duty on the commodity was lifted.
 It is inconceivable that the mobbing of Patrick McMaster was unconnected 
to this power struggle. There is no firm evidence of a conspiracy to “banish” 
the Scots, but the weight of circumstantial evidence outlined above and the 
narrative that follows point to a determination to make an example of the 
McMaster brothers. The friend of government Nathaniel Coffin, who was 
nonetheless able to move freely in Whig circles, reported that at one town 
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meeting “one of our principal Demagogues” taunted “Are not we . . . able to 
humble a few obstinate importers?”69 
v
The humbling of Patrick McMaster was swift and brutal. On the evening 
of Friday, June 1, “hundreds of Men and Boys” led by “one Doctor Thos. 
Young” visited the McMasters’ shop to deliver a cacophony of “threatening 
Declarations.” The scene the McMaster brothers depicted in a petition to 
Governor Hutchinson recalls the Body’s behavior at the homes and prem-
ises of other importers, notable for the sheer size of the gathering, the noise, 
and the absence of serious physical violence. What was different this time, 
however—and this was the reason why the brothers subsequently sought 
Hutchinson’s protection—was that Young “commanded” the McMasters 
“in a Magisterial tone . . . ‘To keep their House and stores shut and to depart 
the Province with all their Effects and property, at, or before 6 O’Clock on 
Monday following [June 4], or else to expect the consequence.’”70 Never be-
fore had a “warning out” to importers carried so precise a timetable for its 
execution.
 Young’s recent rise to prominence owed much to his ability to mobilize 
artisans and laborers, and he likely supposed that a show of force would be 
enough to cow the McMasters. By way of a compromise, the McMasters, evi-
dently—perhaps on Monday, June 4—proposed to shut-up shop and reship 
imported goods “or do any thing else that the Committee should direct.”71 
These concessions the brothers deemed “repugnant to their inclinations and 
injurious to their real Interest,” and in their petition to Hutchinson of June 
5 they asserted their determination to remain in town. It is uncertain if the 
brothers had decided to test the Whigs’ resolve come what may, having “no 
reason to expect equitable Terms from prejudicating Multitudes,” or if they 
were stalling for time in order to “collect their respective demands.” What-
ever, they did not leave.
 The protection that Hutchinson was willing and able to afford at short 
notice would not have amounted to very much. British soldiers had never 
been used to protect importers, and, with feelings running high after the kill-
ings of March 5, any company of soldiers assigned to guard the McMasters’ 
shop would have been in for a rough time. Instead, Hutchinson “mentioned 
the case to a Gentleman of character and influence desiring him to inquire 
into the affair and use his good offices for the protection of these people.” 
The McMaster brothers were reputedly “satisfied” that this gentleman would 
procure them immunity from further harassment.72 If that is so, then they 
77
A Plan “to banish all the Scotchmen”
The Bostonians Paying the Excise-Man or Tarring & Feathering. Lithograph by 
David Claypoole Johnston (Boston: Pendleton, 1830) copied on stone from an 
original print published in London in 1774 by Phillip Dawe.
This is one of several mezzotints propagandizing Boston’s most infamous episode 
of tarring and feathering: the abduction and assault of John Malcom, a British 
customs officer, on January 25, 1774. Here, in the aftermath of the Boston Tea 
Party, the victim is portrayed as the hapless target of colonial radicals.
Digital ID: cph 3a05133. Reproduction number: LC-USZ62-1308. Repository: 
Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540. 
Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Image removed for copyright reasons
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Patrick McMaster’s account of the mobbing identifies his assailants: Elija Story, 
John Ballard, Samuel Franklin, and “Divers others.”
Memorial to Thomas Hutchinson, Castle William, June 27, 1770, enclosed in 
Hutchinson to John Powell, Boston, August 29, 1770. The National Archives of 
the UK: Public Record Office, CO 5/759, f 273.
         Image removed for copyright reasons
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A New Method of Macarony Making as Practised at Boston. Lithograph 
by D. C. Johnston (Boston: Pendleton, 1830) copied on stone from an 
original print published in London in 1774.
This British print presents the victim as bravely awaiting the next stage 
of his ordeal. The text at the foot of the print reads, “[?] Custom House 
officer’s landing the Tea / They tarr’d him and feather’d him, just as you 
see / And they drenched him so well, both behind and before, / That he 
begg’d for God’s sake they would drench him no more.”
Digital ID: cph 3a05134. Reproduction number: LC-USZ62-1309.  
Repository: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division  
Washington, D.C. 20540. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
     Image removed for copyright reasons
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woefully miscalculated. What happened on June 19 was as unexpected as it 
was shocking.
 At 3:00 pm73 the house and store of the McMaster brothers were “Sur-
rounded by Numbers of the Inhabitants”—“some hundreds” strong, Nathan-
iel Coffin recalled. Only Patrick McMaster was at home; according to his 
account “dreadful imprecations” ensued, and a few “swore my immediate 
destruction.” After tearing down the signboard above the front door, several 
of the assailants forced entry. Patrick was promptly “seized” from his hiding 
place and “draged away.” He certainly struggled, for he had to be manhan-
dled outside, where he was bundled into a waiting cart containing buckets of 
tar and feathers “previously prepared for that purpose.”74 
 A common prelude to administering tar and feathers was to exhibit the 
victim to public ridicule. McMaster was duly carted through the “principal 
streets,” whereupon he was exposed to “everey mark of cruelty and Disgrace 
amidst the loud acclamations of innumerable Spectators.” McMaster was so 
terrified that he “Sunk down Speechless.” Coffin thought he had fainted in 
terror, for the Scot was taken to a nearby apothecary and there revived with 
smelling salts. McMaster was actually thankful for the “Compassion” of these 
people, whom he believed had saved him from a severe beating; however, 
their intercession could not stay the “clamerous” mob, which was anxious to 
resume and quite prepared, he later concluded, to let its human quarry “die 
without any Assistance.” Back in the cart he went, “Suported” (probably tied 
into) in a chair; he was then beaten, spat upon, and “reviled with the most 
Abusive Epithets.”75
 The next stage of the ritual invariably involved stripping the victim naked 
before applying the coat of tar and feathers. Coffin was in no doubt that this 
was intended. McMaster’s collapse, however, had prompted the intervention 
of “some prudent persons present,” and at their “earnest Request,” Coffin 
reported, McMaster was spared the hot tar and kept his clothes. A lengthy 
punishment still awaited the Scot, however, and a smaller crowd carted him 
across Boston Neck and two and one half miles out to Roxbury. There he was 
obliged to forswear that he or his brothers would ever return to Boston, on 
pain of death. His assailants then formed a “Line primitive,” escorting him 
out of the cart and across the town boundary into Roxbury. McMaster was 
“no sooner dismissed,” Coffin notes, than a Roxbury mob desired to have the 
“same amusement” with him. McMaster does not specify what these “simi-
lar preparations” were that “compelled me to fly by”—and may again have 
involved tar and feathers and a mock gallows—but it was a “hair breadth 
Escape” according to Coffin.
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 By then it was dusk, and somehow McMaster evaded pursuit from “de-
tached parties” by hiding in ditches and hedges until around 10:00 pm. At 
some point during the next two hours he set out for Castle William. He does 
not mention how he managed to get there or if he had assistance; if he took 
the quickest route, by way of Dorchester Neck, he would have had to have 
been ferried across (unless of course he stole a boat). We can be sure, however, 
that he arrived disheveled, bruised, dirty, and ashamed. One of his brothers 
(we do not know which ) was run out of Marblehead and Salem but managed 
to reach the castle; he believed that the mob was “diligently” searching for the 
other two, and it was at least one week before Patrick learned that they were 
unscathed.76
The McMaster mobbing would appear to correspond to recognizable pat-
terns of extra-legal community action. By ignoring the “warning out” the 
McMaster brothers had exposed themselves to the retributive justice of the 
posse comitatus, in this case the Body of Trade. The search of the house and 
store was a symbolic inversion of customs officers’ authority to locate contra-
band, and it links this incident to New England’s tradition of “rescue riots” 
wherein crowds reclaimed impounded goods. When McMaster was dragged 
outside, murder was not uppermost in anyone’s mind—except perhaps the 
traumatized victim’s; punishment was, however. 
 Community violence was not indiscriminate and punishments were tai-
lored to intimidate rather than to injure seriously.77 Tarring and feathering 
was an extreme form of retribution. Tories and importers were not tarred 
and feathered with impunity, as might be assumed from contemporary Eng-
lish prints or reading Nathaniel Hawthorne’s marvelous and influential short 
story “My Kinsman, Major Molineux.” Usually the threat of tar and feath-
ers was enough to ensure a victim’s compliance.78 The reticence to empty the 
buckets was due to the fact that it was a potentially life-threatening punish-
ment, and, with the emasculated victim being exhibited to public ridicule and 
carted to a gallows, carried for political leaders unwelcome anti-authoritar-
ian overtones.79 In the most recent case prior to the McMaster incident, on 
May 18, the victim, Owen Richards (a Welshman and a tidesman in the Cus-
tomhouse), was nearly blinded by tar before being carted through Boston’s 
streets for upwards of four hours, without any magistrate intervening; sixty-
seven witnesses were forthcoming and five indictments were brought against 
Richards’s assailants.80 A precedent of sorts, then, was in place for humiliat-
ing McMaster with the “indignity of this modern Punishment,” as one Whig 
put it.81
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 The anti-authoritarian aspects of the McMaster mobbing might easily 
be overlooked because the quick intervention of “prudent persons” spared 
the Scot the tar and feathers. The intercessors’ influence would have had to 
have derived from some strong prior association, such as through the Body. 
Thomas Young, though clearly to the fore in the prelude to the mobbing, 
may not have directed any of the proceedings on June 19.82 As McMaster 
observed, the intercessors, whoever they were, could not prevent the crowd 
exacting a lengthy punishment, even though the Scot was probably ready to 
recant his transgressions the moment he regained consciousness. The crowd’s 
independent-mindedness is reminiscent of the raucous forms that community 
violence could take: McMaster was a quarry, taken from his den to be taunted 
and tormented. Neither the McMaster nor the Richards cases should be 
thought of as lynchings, for no one was murdered.83 Instead, they are similar 
to a “rogue’s march” or “skimmington,” a long-established form of commu-
nity action in the Atlantic world for ostracizing social deviants.84 However, 
the mobbings were not just punishments but spectacles of community power. 
As will be seen, those who transgressed the law had nothing to fear from those 
who enforced the law, even if witnesses could be found to give evidence.
 What were McMaster’s assailants celebrating? Intriguingly, McMaster was 
able to identify the ringleaders: “Elija Story Jno Ballard & on[e] Mr Samuell 
Franklin”; there were “Divers others” and “many persons well known.” It 
was John Ballard who administered the oath at the Boston-Roxbury line, 
“Vowing to revenge my refusal [to leave Boston] with instant death swearing 
that my Brothers should be equally treated.” Nothing much else is known 
about them except one other important fact: Ballard was “a Wharfinger to 
the Memorialist.”85 Ballard—a principal felon—was not only personally ac-
quainted with the victim, he was the victim’s most important business contact 
in Boston. Ballard was either the proprietor or the manager of a wharf that 
received and handled the imports arriving for McMasters & Co. We cannot 
be sure if their relationship predated nonimportation and ended with the 
boycott; if so, Ballard could be described as a local businessman or key skilled 
worker who had been radicalized before the proscription of an important 
customer. That may be unlikely in view of the fact that McMaster used the 
present tense when describing Ballard’s occupation; thus Ballard might even 
have been receiving the McMasters’ cargoes of imported goods during the 
past year. If that is so, then Ballard was a more recent convert to nonimporta-
tion. Ballard’s motives in leading the mob may have been personal, of course, 
but they were certainly political when he ended his commercial cooperation 
with the McMasters. 
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 Did Ballard demonstrate his newfound patriotism by abusing a Scot who 
was a principal source of his income? Was that what he and his fellow Bosto-
nians were celebrating? The evidence is ambiguous as to the extent to which 
Ballard, Story, and Franklin acted independently of their political leaders in 
punishing an errant Scot. All the same, we might speculate that their politi-
cal identity was being reconfigured by a form of radicalism that manifestly 
victimized outsiders like McMaster.
 Incandescent with rage not only at his ordeal but also at having been be-
trayed by a man whom he had patronized, McMaster railed at the how he 
could be so “treated and wantonly Deprived” of his trade and “privilidges 
which the British Constitution grants every peaceable Inhabitant. Yet the Me-
morialist is rendered affugitive reduced to Abandon our own Dwelling and 
Leave Our Friends and Fortune to the Fury of a Lawless unrelenting Mob 
Who have Arrogated to themselves the sole power of Governing others while 
they commit every species of outrage with impunity.”86 Thus did the emas-
culated Patrick McMaster find a solace of sorts: not so much in his Scottish 
roots but in the belief that his ordeal arose from a conspiracy to deny him the 
liberties British imperialism conveyed.
 Hitherto, we have considered the McMaster mobbing as being separate 
from the incident at Brookline later that night, but it is likely they were 
linked.87 The most intriguing aspect of that affray is the absence of a trigger. 
Before the mob arrived, Henry Hulton had been conducting the business of 
the Customs Board at home.88 The Hultons later accused Henry’s estranged 
colleague John Temple of willfully procuring the mob—of being an acces-
sory before the fact. (The Boston-born Temple had gotten too close to the 
Whigs for the other commissioners’ liking after his marriage to the daughter 
of wealthy councilor James Bowdoin.) It is most unlikely that Temple had 
anything to do with the affair, although it is possible that he may have said 
something to leading Whigs about Hulton working from home.89 
 Leaving Temple aside, what brought the mob to Brookline? The Whig-
leaning Boston Gazette stressed that after chastising the Scot, McMaster’s 
“numerous attendants peaceably returned” home90—a claim that could be 
interpreted as willful dissociation from the Brookline incident. Timing is im-
portant here. By his own account, McMaster was seized at 3:00 pm; the carting 
in Boston lasted several hours, and it was getting dark when he was brought 
to Roxbury, around 8:00 pm, and he emerged from hiding after 10:00 pm to 
make his way to the castle. Four hours elapsed between the Bostonians deliv-
ering McMaster to the Roxbury mob and the attack on the Hulton place. Did 
the Bostonians deliberate what to do next? Doubtless some would have re-
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turned home, but, on a warm summer evening, perhaps others stayed awhile 
and quenched their thirst. Knowing Henry Hulton was at home, did they 
resolve to pay a visit to the commissioner’s house just two and one half miles 
along the road to Brookline? The mob arrived at Brookline after midnight, 
its leaders armed with clubs and sporting a disguise of white night caps and 
blackened faces; they were reported to have come by the Boston road.91 What 
better way to end the day’s events than with another celebration of commu-
nity power?
 With respect to motives, all that can be said for certain is that the numerous 
and noisy mob succeeded in terrifying the occupants of the Hulton house.92 
While there is a prima facie case for forced entry, unlawful assembly, and riot-
ous behavior, there is no evidence of a determination to assassinate Henry. 
The hotheads present were not bold enough to risk shedding their own blood, 
nor did the Hultons make any mention of them having buckets of tar and 
feathers (though they would not have been able to tell from indoors). In these 
respects, the Brookline affray, like the McMaster mobbing, is akin to a skim-
mington93 (especially if we can imagine colonists satirizing Hulton as a wife-
beater or ministerial whore). As the drama unfolded, Henry realized that 
his family, at least, was unlikely to be harmed. In the early hours of June 20, 
Hulton and his wife sought refuge in a neighbor’s house and spent the next 
two nights with a friend at Cambridge; yet the children remained at Brookline 
with their aunt until June 22, when Henry and Commissioner William Burch 
took their whole families to Castle William.94 
 McMaster’s and the Hultons’ assailants probably returned home satisfied 
with having vicariously punished the British imperial establishment. If that 
is the case, the McMaster mobbing and the Brookline affray, as community-
based actions, condemned British imperial authority and British imperial 
identity embodied by the victims. 
 The punishment of an obnoxious Scot and the abusing of a senior official 
carried little prospect of retribution, yet it went a long way in reminding Brit-
ons of their distinctiveness and vulnerability. No one was ever prosecuted for 
involvement in these incidents. That in itself is not unusual, given that colo-
nists who protested British policies by rioting were rarely subject to legal sanc-
tions on account of two systemic problems: a chronic failure by the king’s law 
officers to collect evidence sufficient to warrant controversial prosecutions in 
the Superior Court and the political hostility of the magistracy and colonial 
juries to any such initiative.95 The unreliability of the provincial magistracy 
was a subtext to the Governor’s Council’s response. The Council agreed with 
Hutchinson’s suggestion that the attorney general should be directed to bring 
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prosecutions against McMaster’s and the Hulton’s assailants, though in the 
latter case the “Tenor of Government . . . required the exercise of their power 
and authority”—to wit, a proclamation was to be issued promising a reward 
of £50 and a pardon for information leading to the “discovery” and “convic-
tion” of the “offenders.” The Council met Hutchinson’s specific request to 
provide for the Hultons’ “security” by inserting a clause in the proclamation 
that the civil magistrates should “exert themselves in the discovery of these 
offenders and preventing the like disorders and outrages for the future.”96 
Such clauses are to be found in most other proclamations concerning rioting: 
to councilors and magistrates it was a legal formality; for Hutchinson, coun-
cilors doing their duty in such a prosaic manner bespoke of gesture politics. 
Before reluctantly agreeing to the proclamation, Hutchinson reported, two 
Whig councilors, James Bowdoin and James Pitts, alleged that Henry Hulton 
had “procured people to make this Assault in order to have a pretence for 
removing to the Castle and rendering the Town obnoxious,” and that this 
would be revealed by any investigation.97
 The adverse political repercussions from any prolonged investigation might 
have deterred Hutchinson’s pursuit of the principal felons and abettors such 
as Thomas Young, particularly with the Boston Massacre trial looming or in 
the unlikely event of Britain prosecuting rioters for treason.98 Moreover, sup-
port for the continuation of the boycott among the merchants began to crum-
ble when Philadelphia and New York suspended nonimportation. McMaster 
and the Hultons were bemused by the patent inconstancy of senior law offi-
cers in pursuing rioters, but the alternative of bringing civil suits against their 
trespassers under common law was an unsettling prospect for any victim of 
mob violence. Colonial institutions and protest, which had effectively nulli-
fied the enforcement of obnoxious imperial laws and the judicial pursuit of 
colonists, now denied beleaguered Britons the protection of the law. 
As sure as revolutions have their victims, empires need their collaborators, 
and in Patrick McMaster and Ann Hulton the British had staunch defend-
ers. Neither Ann Hulton, a disdainful metropolitan sojourner, nor Patrick 
McMaster, an aspirational Lowland Scot, were culturally creolized to any 
significant degree, and both were agents of imperial authority, albeit in dif-
ferent ways.
 Well might Ann Hulton lament of “the want of protection” afforded offi-
cials and importers who tried to withstand the “Tyranny of the Multitude.”99 
It is understandable why she disparaged the colonial protest movement at 
every opportunity, and why, after meeting McMaster, she should suppose 
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that there was a conspiracy against imperial officials and Boston’s Scots. The 
Scots shipbuilders had given cause enough for resentment when they tried 
to divide the community by appealing to workers to think not of their coun-
try—Massachusetts—but of their empty pockets. The principal rationale for 
the community action taken against Patrick McMaster was that it quashed 
dissent, but for some of the rioters it was a means to evince their patriotism. 
Although there is no firm evidence of a movement to expel the Scots, Ann 
Hulton’s accusations nevertheless illuminate the circumstances that brought 
together Scottish merchants and English imperial officials. Both were victims 
of political radicalism and political mobilization. Ann Hulton returned to 
Brookline in the early autumn, and when the troubles returned she was only 
too pleased to leave for England in 1775.
 Boston provided fewer economic opportunities for Scottish migrants than 
other parts of the colonies, yet for the McMaster brothers it had been a gate-
way to an empire of opportunity. When that gateway closed they quickly 
sought others. First at Castle William, they defiantly conducted business as 
usual from a temporary “warehouse”—no doubt with the aid of those Bos-
tonians who “Joyfully received” the brothers on their return to Boston when 
the boycott ended. For the next five years the McMasters concentrated on 
building up their business at Portsmouth, out of which they ran the ship 
Glenluce (of which they owned three-quarters) in the American coastal trade. 
On July 5, 1775, Patrick McMaster joined the fourth company of the Loyal 
American Association with Daniel and a handful of other Scots merchants. 
The following year he left Boston with the British evacuation fleet that sailed 
for Halifax, Nova Scotia. The McMasters settled in Penobscot, from whence 
they joined the loyalist exodus to New Brunswick; they succeeded in reestab-
lishing the family business and, after receiving several Crown grants of land, 
went on to acquire substantial landholdings in Charlotte County, where their 
descendants remain.100 
 At their journey’s end, the McMaster brothers sought and won compensa-
tion for their losses from the British government—but only after reminding 
the royal commission of how much their loyalism was a fusion of their Scot-
tish and British imperial identities. The brothers’ memorial stands as a badge 
of honor to the “unblemished reputations and unshaken loyalty” of their 
Galloway “ancestors,” whose world was blighted by the Jacobite Rebellion 
of 1745, and to their own tribulations in an Atlantic world beset by revolu-
tion. Even if, like most loyalists, the brothers exaggerated the value of their 
losses, their estimates of £8,808 New England currency for debts due to the 
business at Boston and £7,561 for Portsmouth indicate that the McMasters 
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were substantial, successful traders. The Glenluce and her cargo, together 
worth some £4,000 currency, were also lost.101 Eventually the brothers re-
ceived £405 sterling for a claim of £569 (the sixth highest among Boston’s 
Scots) with respect to property confiscated by New Hampshire and Massa-
chusetts.102
 Despite Patrick McMaster’s ordeal one cannot assume that the loyalism of 
the Scots derived from deep-seated ethnic antagonisms. More significantly, 
the McMaster brothers were not so much conscious of their minority status 
as assertive of a possessive individualism that they believed their imperial 
identity legitimized. We might think it unfortunate that they arrived at politi-
cally inopportune moments; the less charitable contemporary Bostonian view 
is that the acquisitive Scots all too readily embraced British imperialism for 
their own ends. Had McMaster been tarred and feathered it is conceivable 
that this savage ritual could have been iconized in the popular prints as a 
treatment peculiarly suitable for greedy Scottish merchants.
 In considering what life was like for Britons in pre-Revolutionary Boston, 
it would be churlish to suggest that Revolutionary historians are inattentive 
to issues pertaining to contemporaries’ identities. But the victimization of ob-
noxious Britons on June 19, 1770, is likely indicative of a divergence of Brit-
ish identities at a local level. On the one hand were two very different Britons, 
a Scot and Englishwoman thrown together by circumstances and experiences, 
who found common ground in their enunciation of British imperial identity. 
On the other were the provincials—Whig merchants, radical democrats like 
Thomas Young, and over-eager footsoldiers like John Ballard—whose unity 
of purpose was cemented by their condemnation of threatening outsiders and 
their renunciation of a type of Britishness embodied by their victims.
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